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1 INTRODUCTION
Operators use containers – enabled by operating system (OS) level
virtualization – to deploy virtual network functions (VNFs) that
access the centralized network controller in software-defined net-
working (SDN) deployments. While SDN allows flexible network
configuration, it also increases the attack surface on the network
deployment [8]. For example, insecure communication channels
may be tapped to extract or inject sensitive data transferred on the
north-bound interface, between the network controller and VNFs;
furthermore, to protect the network controller from malicious VNF
instances, the integrity and authenticity of VNFs must be verified
prior to deployment.
Scott et al. described in [8] threats to the security of VNFs, such as
unauthorized access, data modification, data leakage, and malicious
or compromised applications. Some of the enumerated threats are
mitigated by protecting north-bound communication using stan-
dard network communication security protocols such as Transport
Layer Security (TLS) with server- or mutual authentication. How-
ever, while the use of TLS prevents certain classes of attacks – e.g.
topology spoofing, traffic eavesdropping – it shifts the focus to the
protection of authentication credentials.
VNFs may contain exploitable vulnerabilities allowing attackers
to obtain their authentication credentials. For VNFs deployed in
containers, vulnerabilities in the OS isolation layer may render
the container host – and a fortiori the neighboring containers –
vulnerable to attacks on data integrity and confidentiality [4].
Integrity monitoring and integrity verification are used to de-
tect the compromise of the OS virtualization layer and of VNFs
deployed in containers. For example, commodity isolated execution
environments have been used in earlier work to strengthen the
security guarantees in SDN deployments. Kim et al. explored the
design space for SGX-enabled software-defined inter-domain rout-
ing, peer-to-peer anonymity networks and middleboxes [6]; Shih et
al. described an approach for protecting internal network function
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virtualization states from tampering by a malicious datacenter ad-
ministrator [9]; Coughlin et al. showed that performance-sensitive
applications such as packet processing can be performed in isolated
execution environments with an acceptable overhead [5]. However,
ensuring and verifying the integrity of VNFs, as well as ensuring the
confidentiality of VNF authentication credentials have not been ad-
dressed so far. We build upon previous work [7] to provide security
guarantees regarding the integrity or VNFs deployed in containers
prior to their deployment.
To mitigate the risks described above, we implemented a proto-
type that leverages hardware-based mechanisms for isolated exe-
cution implemented by Intel SGX in combination with a run-time
integrity measurement subsystem, namely Linux Integrity Measure-
ment Architecture (IMA)1. This prototype is a first step towards
providing to tenants and end-users integrity guarantees regarding
the network components in SDN deployments.
2 ARCHITECTURE
A high-level architecture of an SDN deployment is illustrated in
Figure 1. The figure also highlights additional security components
introduced for integrity verification and monitoring.
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Figure 1: High-level architecture of an SDN deployment
with additional security components.
In our implementation we leverage the Representational State
Transfer (REST) application programming interface (API) for com-
munication between VNFs and network controller. We assume
that the container host is equipped with a hardware-based isolated
execution environment, such as AMD Secure Encrypted Virtual-
ization [1], ARM TrustZone [3], SecureBlue++ [10], Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [2], or similar. We introduce a Verifica-
tion Manager module that has a central position in our proposed
architecture: it obtains integrity measurements of VNFs through an
attestation protocol and appraises the trustworthiness of the plat-
form. Furthermore, it handles the communication with third-party
1Linux IMA project page: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/
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attestation services, generates the HMAC key and nonces, as well
as the certificates for the client authentication. To create trusted iso-
lated execution environments (TEEs), we have chosen to use Intel
SGX due to its popularity and availability on commodity platforms;
however, other hardware-based isolated execution environment
can be used to implement the described architecture. The Verifi-
cation Manager communicates with special-purpose TEE enclaves
to (1) extract integrity measurements of the software running on
the container host to assess its trustworthiness and (2) provision
or revoke authentication keys that can be used by VNFs as long as
the container host is trustworthy.
We assume that the controller is connected via a secure channel
to the container host and network applications running inside the
containers (we implement this using TLS) . The workflow (illus-
trated in Figure 1) starts with the Verification Manager 1 which
initiates the remote attestation of the container host. The Verifica-
tion Manager contacts the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) – using the
protocol provided by the SGX implementation2 – to both verify the
validity of the enclave key against the revocation list and the valid-
ity of the integrity quote 2 . We use the attestation functionality
of SGX enclaves to measure the code loaded into the enclave prior
to initialization (after that the enclaves becomes immutable [2]).
Upon a successful completion of the remote attestation protocol,
the enclave sends to the Verification Manager a quote containing
the integrity measurement list with measurements of the software
on the container host. The integrity measurement list is produced
by the Linux Integrity Measurement subsystem, which allows to
collect measurements of certain files (the measurement targets are
configured by the administrator in a policy file). The Verification
Manager appraises the trustworthiness of the container host based
on the obtained quote. The protocol continues only if the host is
considered trustworthy following the appraisal.
After the attestation with the container host has been completed
successfully, the Verification Manager starts the remote attestation
of the VNF enclaves 3 – e.g. VNF 1 and VNF 2 in Figure 1. Next,
the Verification Manager interacts with the IAS 4 to verify the
validity of the integrity quote produced by the enclaves storing the
VNF credentials, namely TEE 1 and TEE 2 in Figure 1.
Upon successful verification of the integrity quotes, the Ver-
ification Manager generates the certificate and private key and
provisions them to the corresponding VNFs enclaves 5 . Once the
authentication credentials are successfully provisioned, the VNFs
can communicate with the network controller 6 . The credentials
do not leave at any point the security context of the enclaves. Thus,
to communicate with the network controller a VNF invokes its
corresponding enclave, which then establishes a TLS session with
the network controller. In our implementation, the security context
established for each TLS session (including the session key) does not
leave the enclave. An investigation of alternative implementations
(and their performance impact) is left for future work.
3 USE CASES AND DEMONSTRATION
We implemented a prototype using Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with kernel
version 4.4.0-51-generic for both the container host and network
controller host. We used Docker version 1.12.2 to deploy VNFs
2Intel SGX Software Development Kit page: https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx-sdk
inside containers, which communicate with a Floodlight network
controller version 1.2. Finally, we used mbedtls-SGX3 TLS protocol
suite to implement a secure channel between the enclaves on the
container host and the Verification Manager. Floodlight supports
three different security modes for the REST API, non-secure (plain
HTTP), HTTPS and trusted HTTPS (with client authentication).
Floodlight performs client certificate validation by adding client
certificates to its keystore, which introduces the challenge of main-
taining the keystore updated with newly created keys. We solve
this by provisioning the controller with a trusted certficate au-
thority, rather than all client certificates. The Verification Manager
acts as a certificate authority, and signs all newly created client
certificates. The Floodlight controller must only validate that the
client certificate has a valid signature from the trusted certificate
authority.
The approach is based on two use cases. The first use case is
the integrity attestation of a VNF. This is done by requesting a
quote from the application attestation enclave (step 3 to 4 of
Figure 1), that is then verified and matched against the expected
values by the Verification Manager. This use case is demonstrated
by the attestation protocol, communication with IAS, and matching
the actual and expected measurements.
The second use case is enrolling the VNF into the SDN deploy-
ment. A prerequisite for this is that the VNF has been attested as
above. The Verification Manager then generates a key and certifi-
cate, signs the certificate with its certificate authority, and next
provisions the VNF’s enclave with the key material. This corre-
sponds to step 5 of Figure 1. The provisioned key can then be
used to establish a secure communication session with the SDN
controller. This use case addresses key provisioning and ensures
that entities without correct credentials cannot enroll in the SDN
deployment.
4 FUTUREWORK
The integrity measurements of the container host are not currently
protected by a hardware root of trust, such as a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM). Integrity measurements are thus vulnerable to tem-
pering by an adversary having root access to the container host. In
future work we intend to implement a communication protocol to
enable the integrity attestation enclave to retrieve authenticated
integrity measurements from a TPM deployed on the platform.
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